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Abstract. We use generating functional analysis to study minority-game type
market models with generalized strategy valuation updates that control the
psychology of agents’ actions. The agents’ choice between trend following and
contrarian trading, and their vigor in each, depends on the overall state of the
market. Even in ‘fake history’ models, the theory now involves an effective overall
bid process (coupled to the effective agent process) which can exhibit profound
remanence effects and new phase transitions. For some models the bid process
can be solved directly, others require Maxwell-construction type approximations.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Ht
1. Introduction
Minority games (MG) [1, 2] are simple models proposed about a decade ago to understand
the origin of the cooperative phenomena and nontrivial fluctuations observed in financial
markets, on the basis of so-called inductive decision making by imperfect interacting agents
[3]. With the recent exposure of the inadequacy of classical economic modeling that assumes
full rationality, intelligence and honesty of market players and evolution to an efficient stable
market, the case for the alternative MG approach to market models is probably beyond
discussion. The further strength of MG-type models is that they can be solved analytically;
especially the generating functional analysis (GFA) method has proven to be an effective tool
in this field [4, 5, 6]. We refer to the recent textbooks [7, 8] for historical backgrounds, the
connection between MGs and markets, details on mathematical methods, and full references.
Standard MG models are now understood reasonably well, so the next task is to
generalize the mathematical technology developed so as to apply to models that are more
realistic economically. In this paper we try to contribute to this aim, by studying analytically
MG-type models in which we generalize the agents’ strategy valuation rules: the strategy
type to be rewarded (and by how much) depends on the overall market bid A. Agents can
switch from a contrarian to a trend-following strategy, and adjust their level of caution, on
the basis of how anomalous they perceive the market to be. Such ingredients are incorporated
easily into the fabric of MG-type models, by enhancing the valuation update with a function
F [A] of the excess demand; the question is how to decide which agent behaviour should be
encoded in this function, and how to solve mathematically the resulting GFA equations.
By changing the magnitude of the valuation updates in the MG in an A-dependent way,
we can model a preference of agents (who remain contrarians) for profitable decisions with
large excess demand/supply (high-risk high-gain behaviour), or model the opposite situation
where they prefer small excess demand/supply (low-risk low-gain behaviour). If we also allow
agents to switch to trend-following, there are two possible routes. One could argue that when
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markets are booming, equity prices tend to rise slowly and the trading volume increases (so
agents are trend-followers, as in the majority game [10]), until the magnitude |A| of the
overall market bid becomes too large, leading to turmoil and contrarian behaviour. This was
the view of [11, 12]. Alternatively, one could argue that for small |A| the market would be
regarded as normal, and agents would seek advantage by contrarian trading, whereas large
|A| would be regarded as anomalous, prompting panic-driven trend-following.
In this paper we first develop the theory for MG-type models with arbitrary valuation
update functions F [A]. Then we focus on the above three agent behaviour scenarios: a
model of strict contrarians with controlled degrees of caution versus greed, one where non-
volatile markets are interpreted as risk free and prompt trend-following (agents only become
contrarians under volatile conditions), and one where in non-volatile markets agents are
contrarians (switching to panic-driven trend-following under volatile conditions). Although
the latter two cases are mathematically similar, they lead to qualitatively different solutions.
We will find that certain regions of the phase diagram are characterized by prominent
remanence effects, with multiple locally stable states, prompting us to rely on approximations
of the Maxwell-construction type. As a result, whereas our predictions are confirmed
satisfactorily by numerical simulations in non-remanent cases, when there is remanence, there
remain deviations and gaps in our understanding which will require further investigation.
2. Definitions
Let there to be N agents in the game, labeled by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where N is odd. The game
proceeds at discrete steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At every step t each agent takes a binary decision
bi(t) ∈ {−1, 1}, the ‘bid’, representing e.g. buying (−1) versus selling (+1). A re-scaled
aggregate overall bid at step t is defined as A(t) = N−1/2
∑N
i=1
bi(t) +Ae(t), where Ae(t) is
an external contribution, representing perturbations, the impact of large market operators,
or the action of regulators. At each step, the agents are provided with external information,
which in fake history MGs is a random number µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Each agent i has two
strategies Ria, with a = 1, 2, with which to map each µ to a trading action:
R
ia : {1, . . . , p} → {−1, 1}
A strategy functions as a lookup-table with p entries, all of which are drawn independently
at random from {−1, 1} (with equal probabilities) before the start of the game. If agent i
uses strategy a at step t, then he will act (deterministically) according to bi(t) = R
µ(t)
ia .
In the standard MG an agent makes profit if he finds himself in the minority, i.e. if
A(t)bi(t) < 0. Each agent monitors the performance of his two strategies (irrespective
of whether they were used), by measuring the so-called valuations pia(t), defined via
pia(t + 1) = pia(t) − η˜A(t) Rµ(t)ia . Here η˜ > 0 denotes a ‘learning rate’. At each step t of
the game, each agent i will select his best strategy ai(t) at that stage of the process, defined
as ai(t) = arg maxa∈{1,2}{pia(t)}. Agents thus behave as ‘contrarians’. Here we generalize
this rule in the spirit of [11], to incorporate the possibility that whether agents behave as
contrarians or trend-followers may depend dynamically on whether they perceive the market
state A(t) to be close to or far from its ‘natural’ value: pia(t+1) = pia(t)−η˜Rµ(t)ia F [A(t)], with
F [−A] = −F [A] (to retain A = 0 as the ‘natural’ value for the overall bid). In the ‘batch’
version of the above dynamics one replaces in the evolution equations for the valuations the
randomly drawn information µ(t) by an average over {1, . . . , p}. The result is
pia(t+1) = pia(t)− η˜√
N
p∑
µ=1
F [Aµ(t)]R
µ
ia (1)
Aµ(t) = Ae(t) +
1√
N
N∑
i=1
Rµiai(t) (2)
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We switch in the usual manner to new variables qi(t) =
1
2
[pi1(t)− pi2(t)], ξiµ = 12 (Rµi1−Rµi2),
ωiµ =
1
2
(Rµi1 + R
µ
i2), and Ωµ = N
−1/2∑
i
ωµi . We choose η˜ = 2, and add perturbations
θi(t) in order to define response functions. We introduce decision noise by replacing
sgn[qi(t)] → σ[qi(t), zi(t)], in which the {zj(t)} are independent and zero average Gaussian
random numbers (the standard examples are additive and multiplicative noise definitions,
corresponding to σ[q, z] = sgn[q + Tz] and σ[q, z] = sgn[q] sgn[1 + Tz]). This leaves us with
qi(t+1) = qi(t) + θi(t)− 2√
N
p∑
µ=1
ξµi F [Aµ(t)] (3)
Aµ(t) = Ae(t) + Ωµ +
1√
N
N∑
j=1
ξµj σ[qj(t), zj(t)] (4)
One obtains the standard batch MG for F [A] = A, and a batchmajority game for F [A] = −A.
We will develop the theory initially for arbitrary F [A], but focus ultimately on the choices
F [A] = sgn(A)|A|γ , F [A] = τA
[
1− A2/A20
]
(5)
with τ = ±1 and A0 > 0. In the second formula, for τ = −1 the agents behave as a trend-
followers (majority game play) when |A| < A0, but switch to contrarians (minority game
play) for |A| > A0; this is the model of [11, 12]. For τ = 1 the situation is reversed.
We will write averaging over the stochastic process (3) as 〈. . .〉. The global bid
fluctuations in the system are characterized by the volatility matrix Ξtt′ :
Ξtt′ =
1
p
p∑
µ=1
〈[
Aµ(t)− 1
p
p∑
ν=1
〈Aν(t)〉
][
Aµ(t
′)− 1
p
p∑
ν=1
〈Aν(t′)〉
]〉
(6)
From this follows the conventional market volatility σ via σ2 = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑τ
t=1
Ξtt.
3. Generating functional analysis
The appropriate moment generating functional for a stochastic process of the type (3), given
that now we will be interested also in overall bid statistics, is
Z[ψ,φ] =
〈
e
i
∑
t≥0
∑
i
ψi(t)σ[qi(t),zi(t)]+i
√
2
∑
t≥0
∑
µ
φµ(t)Aµ(t)
〉
(7)
with Aµ(t) as defined in (4). For (7) to be well defined, we specify an upper time limit tmax.
Taking suitable derivatives of the (7) with respect to the variables {ψi(t), φµ(t)} generates
all moments of the random variables {σ[qi(t), zi(t)]} and {Aµ(t)}, at arbitrary times, e.g.
〈σ[qi(t), zi(t)]〉 = − i lim
ψ,φ→0
∂Z[ψ,φ]
∂ψi(t)
(8)
〈σ[qi(t), zi(t)]σ[qj(t′), zj(t′)]〉 = − lim
ψ,φ→0
∂2Z[ψ,φ]
∂ψi(t)∂ψj(t′)
(9)
〈Aµ[q(t), z(t)]〉 = − i√
2
lim
ψ,φ→0
∂Z[ψ,φ]
∂φµ(t)
(10)
〈Aµ[q(t), z(t)]Aν [q(t′), z(t′)]〉 = − 1
2
lim
ψ,φ→0
∂2Z[ψ,φ]
∂φµ(t)∂φν(t′)
(11)
Averaging (7) over the disorder (the strategies) allows us to obtain from (8,9,10,11)
expressions for disorder-averaged observables, such as correlation and response functions:
Ctt′ =
1
N
∑
i
〈σ[qi(t), zi(t)]σ[qi(t′), zi(t′)]〉 = − lim
ψ→0
1
N
∑
i
∂2Z[ψ]
∂ψi(t)∂ψi(t′)
(12)
Gtt′ =
1
N
∑
i
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈σ[qi(t), zi(t)]〉 = − lim
ψ→0
i
N
∑
i
∂2Z[ψ]
∂ψi(t)∂θi(t′)
(13)
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3.1. Evaluation of the disorder average
We write (7) in the usual way as an integral over all possible values of the qi(t) and the Aµ(t)
at all times, and insert δ-functions to select the solution of (3), followed by averaging over
the noise z = {zi(t)}. With the short-hand si(t) = σ[qi(t), zi(t)] we obtain:
Z[ψ,φ] =
∫ [∏
µt
dAµ(t)dAˆµ(t)
2π
eiAˆµ(t)[Aµ(t)−Ae(t)]+i
√
2φµ(t)Aµ(t)
]
×
〈∫
p0(q(0))
[∏
it
dqi(t)dqˆi(t)
2π
eiqˆi(t)[qi(t+1)−qi(t)−θi(t)]+iψi(t)si(t)
]
×
∏
iµ
e
i√
N
∑
t
{2ξµ
i
qˆi(t)F [Aµ(t)]−Aˆµ(t)[ωµi +ξ
µ
i
si(t)]}
〉
z
(14)
The disorder variables appear only in the last line, so
Z[ψ,φ] =
∫ [∏
µt
dAµ(t)dAˆµ(t)
2π
eiAˆµ(t)[Aµ(t)−Ae(t)]+i
√
2φµ(t)Aµ(t)
]
(15)
×
〈∫
p0(q(0))
[∏
it
dqi(t)dqˆi(t)
2π
eiqˆi(t)[qi(t+1)−qi(t)−θi(t)]+iψi(t)si(t)
]
Ξ
〉
z
with
Ξ =
∏
iµ
e
i√
N
∑
t
{(R1−R2)qˆi(t)F [Aµ(t)]− 12 Aˆµ(t)[R1+R2+(R1−R2)si(t)]}
=
∏
µ
e
− 1
4
∑
tt′ Aˆµ(t)Aˆµ(t
′)−
∑
tt′ Ltt′F [Aµ(t)]F [Aµ(t
′)]− 1
4
∑
tt′ Ctt′ Aˆµ(t)Aˆµ(t
′)
× e
∑
tt′ Ktt′ Aˆµ(t)F [Aµ(t
′)]+O(N−1)
(16)
where we introduced the temporary abbreviations
Ctt′ =
1
N
∑
i
si(t)si(t
′) Ktt′ =
1
N
∑
i
si(t)qˆi(t
′) Ltt′ =
1
N
∑
i
qˆi(t)qˆi(t
′)
We isolate these as usual by inserting appropriate δ-functions (in integral representation,
which generates conjugate integration variables), and define the short-hands DC =∏
tt′ [dCtt′/
√
2π] and DA = ∏
t
[dA(t)/
√
2π] (with similar definitions for the other kernels
and functions). Substitution into Z[ψ,φ], followed by re-arranging terms, then leads us to
Z[ψ,φ] =
∫
[DCDCˆ ][DKDKˆ ][DLDLˆ] eiN
∑
tt′ [Cˆtt′Ctt′+Kˆtt′Ktt′+Lˆtt′Ltt′ ]+O(log(N))
×
〈∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) ei
∑
ti
qˆi(t)[qi(t+1)−qi(t)−θi(t)]+i
∑
it
ψi(t)si(t)
× e−i
∑
i
∑
tt′ [Cˆtt′ si(t)si(t
′)+Kˆtt′ si(t)qˆi(t
′)+Lˆtt′ qˆi(t)qˆi(t
′)]
〉
z
×
∏
µ
∫
DADAˆ ei
∑
t
[
Aˆ(t)[A(t)−Ae(t)]+i
√
2φµ(t)A(t)
]
− 1
4
∑
tt′ Aˆ(t)[1+Ctt′ ]Aˆ(t
′)
× e−
∑
tt′ Ltt′F [A(t)]F [A(t
′)]+
∑
tt′ Ktt′ Aˆ(t)F [A(t
′)]
(17)
Upon assuming simple initial conditions of the form p0(q) =
∏
i
p0(qi) we then arrive at
Z[ψ,φ] =
∫
[DCDCˆ][DKDKˆ ][DLDLˆ] eN[Ψ+Φ+Ω]+O(log(N)) (18)
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with
Ψ = i
∑
tt′
[Cˆtt′Ctt′ + Kˆtt′Ktt′ + Lˆtt′Ltt′ ] (19)
Φ =
1
N
∑
µ
log
∫
DADAˆ ei
∑
t
[
Aˆ(t)[A(t)−Ae(t)]+i
√
2φµ(t)A(t)
]
(20)
× e− 14
∑
tt′ Aˆ(t)[1+Ctt′ ]Aˆ(t
′)−
∑
tt′ Ltt′F [A(t)]F [A(t
′)]+
∑
tt′ Ktt′ Aˆ(t)F [A(t
′)]
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
log
〈∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0))
× ei
∑
t
[qˆ(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θi(t)]+ψi(t)σ[q(t),z(t)]]−i
∑
tt′ qˆ(t)Lˆtt′ qˆ(t
′)
× e−i
∑
tt′ [Cˆtt′σ[q(t),z(t)]σ[q(t
′),z(t′)]+Kˆtt′σ[q(t),z(t)]qˆ(t
′)]
〉
z
(21)
The O(log(N)) term in the exponent of (18) is independent of {ψi(t), φµ(t), θi(t)}, and the
external bid Ae(ℓ) and the introduced valuation update function F [A] appear only in Φ.
3.2. Saddle-point equations and interpretation of order parameters
The disorder-averaged functional (18) is evaluated by steepest descent integration, leading
to coupled equations from which to solve the dynamic order parameters {C, Cˆ,K, Kˆ, L, Lˆ}:
Ctt′ = 〈 σ[q(t), z(t)] σ[q(t′), z(t′)] 〉⋆ (22)
Ktt′ = 〈 σ[q(t), z(t)] qˆ(t′) 〉⋆ (23)
Ltt′ = 〈 qˆ(t)qˆ(t′) 〉⋆ (24)
Cˆtt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ctt′
Kˆtt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ktt′
Lˆtt′ =
i∂Φ
∂Ltt′
(25)
The notation 〈. . .〉⋆ in the above expressions is a short-hand for
〈g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉⋆ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∫
DqDqˆ 〈Mi[{q, qˆ, z}]g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z∫
DqDqˆ 〈Mi[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z
(26)
Mi[{q, qˆ, z}] = p0(q(0)) ei
∑
t
qˆ(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θi(t)]+i
∑
t
ψi(t)σ[q(t),z(t)]
× e−i
∑
tt′ [Cˆtt′σ[q(t),z(t)]σ[q(t
′),z(t′)]+Kˆtt′σ[q(t),z(t)]qˆ(t
′)]
× e−i
∑
tt′ Lˆtt′ qˆ(t)qˆ(t
′)
(27)
Since the bid contribution Ae(t) appears only in Φ, one can take over standard results from
the theory of batch MGs with regard to interpretation and simplification of order parameters
(see e.g. [8]). Using the normalization identity limψ,φ→0 Z[ψ,φ] = 1 we find
Ctt′ = lim
ψ,φ→0
〈σ[q(t), z(t)]σ[q(t′), z(t′)]〉⋆ (28)
Gtt′ = − i lim
ψ,φ→0
〈σ[q(t), z(t)]qˆ(t′)〉⋆ (29)
0 = − lim
ψ,φ→0
〈qˆ(t)qˆ(t′)〉⋆ (30)
These expressions (28,29,30) are to be evaluated at the physical saddle-point of Ψ + Ω + Φ.
We conclude from (29) and (30), in combination with (23,24) that for all (t, t′)
Ktt′ = iGtt′ , Ltt′ = 0 (31)
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We now send the fields {ψi, φµ} to zero, and choose the {θi} to be independent of i. The
measure Mi[{q, qˆ, z}] then loses its dependence on i, and equations (22,23,24,25) simplify to
Ctt′ = 〈 σ[q(t), z(t)] σ[q(t′), z(t′)] 〉⋆ (32)
Gtt′ = − i〈 σ[q(t), z(t)] qˆ(t′) 〉⋆ (33)
Cˆtt′ = lim
L→0
i∂Φ
∂Ctt′
, Kˆtt′ = lim
L→0
i∂Φ
∂Ktt′
, Lˆtt′ = lim
L→0
i∂Φ
∂Ltt′
(34)
with
〈g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉⋆ =
∫
DqDqˆ 〈M [{q, qˆ, z}]g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z∫
DqDqˆ 〈M [{q, qˆ, z}]〉z
(35)
M [{q, qˆ, z}] = p0(q(0)) ei
∑
t
qˆ(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)]−i
∑
tt′ Lˆtt′ qˆ(t)qˆ(t
′)
× e−i
∑
tt′ [Cˆtt′σ[q(t),z(t)]σ[q(t
′),z(t′)]+Kˆtt′σ[q(t),z(t)]qˆ(t
′)]
(36)
3.3. Evaluation of Φ
We turn our attention to the function Φ (20), which, according to (34), we only need to know
for small L. We define the matrices 1I and D, with entries 1Itt′ = δtt′ and Dtt′ = 1+Ctt′ , and
the short-hands A = {A(t)}, Ae = {Ae(t)} and F [A] = {F [A(t)]}. This allows us to write
Φ =
1
N
∑
µ
log
∫
dAdξ P(ξ)δ[A−Ae +GF[A]− ξ]
× ei
√
2
∑
t
φµ(t)A(t)−
∑
tt′ Ltt′F [A(t)]F [A(t
′)]
(37)
with
P (ξ) =
∏
t
(1/
√
2π)√
det[ 1
2
D]
e−ξ·D
−1ξ (38)
At the saddle-point, G must obey causality, so we can interpret the above expression in terms
of an effective stochastic process for the bid, with a zero average Gaussian noise field ξ(t):
A(t) = Ae(t)−
∑
t′<t
Gtt′F [A(t
′)] + ξ(t) (39)
〈ξ(t)〉 = 0, 〈ξ(t)ξ(t′)〉 = 1
2
Dtt′ (40)
The situation is clearly reminiscent of real history MGs [9], although the equations are
simpler. From now on we write averages over (39,40) simply as 〈. . .〉. We also define
Φ0 = α log
∫
dAdξ P(ξ)δ[A−Ae +GF[A]− ξ] (41)
At the saddle-point we have Φ0 = 0. We expand Φ for small L and small φ:
Φ = Φ0 +
i
√
2
N
∑
µt
φµ(t)〈A(t)〉 − α
∑
tt′
Ltt′〈F [A(t)]F [A(t′)]〉
− 1
N
∑
µtt′
φµ(t)φµ(t
′)[〈A(t)A(t′)〉 − 〈A(t)〉〈A(t′)〉] +O(φ3, L2) (42)
Clearly, limφ→0,L→0 Φ = Φ0, and Φ0 depends on G only, not on C or L. From our expansion
of Φ we can extract all the quantities we are interested in. We only have to be careful that
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causality can only be assumed after the differentiations:
Cˆtt′ = lim
L→0,φ→0
i∂Φ
∂Ctt′
= 0 (43)
Kˆtt′ = lim
L→0,φ→0
∂Φ
∂Gtt′
=
∂Φ0
∂Gtt′
= −α ∂
∂Ae(t)
〈F [A(t′)]〉 (44)
Lˆtt′ = lim
L→0
i∂Φ
∂Ltt′
= −iα〈F [A(t)]F [A(t′)]〉 (45)
We define the bid response function Rtt′ = ∂〈F [A(t)]〉/∂Ae(t′) and the bid covariance
function Σtt′ = 2〈F [A(t)]F [A(t′)]〉, so Kˆtt′ = −αRt′t and Lˆtt′ = − 12 iαΣtt′ . Causality
ensures that Rtt′ = 0 for t < t
′, and Rtt = 1. We can also calculate bid statistics:
〈Aµ[q(t),z(t)]〉 = − i√
2
lim
ψ,φ→0
∂Z[ψ,φ]
∂φµ(t)
= 〈A(t)〉 (46)
〈Aµ[q(t),z(t)]Aν [q(t′), z(t′)]〉 = −1
2
lim
ψ,φ→0
∂2Z[ψ,φ]
∂φµ(t)∂φν(t′)
= 〈A(t)A(t′)〉 (47)
3.4. The effective single agent equation
The above results lead to a further simplification of our saddle-point equations (32,33,34):
Ctt′ = 〈 σ[q(t), z(t)] σ[q(t′), z(t′)] 〉⋆ (48)
Gtt′ = − i〈 σ[q(t), z(t)] qˆ(t′) 〉⋆ (49)
with
〈g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉⋆ =
∫
DqDqˆ 〈M [{q, qˆ, z}]g[{q, qˆ, z}]〉z∫
DqDqˆ 〈M [{q, qˆ, z}]〉z
(50)
M [{q, qˆ, z}] = p0(q(0))ei
∑
t
qˆ(t)[q(t+1)−q(t)−θ(t)+α
∑
t′ Rtt′σ[q(t
′),z(t′)]]−1
2
α
∑
tt′ qˆ(t)Σtt′ qˆ(t
′)
(51)
We eliminate the {qˆ(t)} by exploiting causality: the term ∑
t′ Rtt′σ[q(t
′), z(t′)] in (51)
involves only values of q(t′) with t′ ≤ t. This allows us to calculate the denominator of
the fraction (50) by integrating out the variables {q(t)} iteratively, first over q(tmax) (which
gives us δ[qˆ(tmax − 1)]), followed by integration over q(tmax − 1), etc. The result is simply∫
DqDqˆ M [{q, qˆ, z}] =
∫
dq(0) p0(q(0)) = 1 (52)
This, in turn, implies that
〈σ[q(t), z(t)]qˆ(t′)〉⋆ = i ∂
∂θ(t′)
〈σ[q(t), z(t)]〉⋆
We do the remaining integrals over {qˆ}, and write our equations in the simpler form
Ctt′ = 〈σ[q(t), z(t)]σ[q(t′), z(t′)]〉⋆ Gtt′ = ∂〈σ[q(t), z(t)]〉⋆
∂θ(t′)
(53)
with 〈g[{q, z}]〉⋆ =
∫
[
∏
t
dq(t)] 〈M [{q, z}]g[{q, z}]〉z and
M [{q, z}] = p0(q(0))
∫ ∏
t
[
dη(t)√
2π
]
e
− 1
2
∑
tt′ η(t)(Σ
−1)tt′η(t
′)
√
detΣ
×
∏
t≥0
δ
[
q(t+ 1)− q(t)− θ(t) + α
∑
t′
Rtt′σ[q(t
′), z(t′)]−√αη(t)
]
(54)
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We recognize that (54) is the measure corresponding to a single-agent process of the form
q(t+ 1) = q(t) + θ(t)− α
∑
t′≤t
Rtt′σ[q(t
′), z(t′)] +
√
α η(t) (55)
in which η(t) is a zero-mean Gaussian noise, with temporal correlations 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = Σtt′ .
The two kernels Σ and R are to be calculated from
Rtt′ =
∂
∂Ae(t′)
〈F [A(t)]〉, Σtt′ = 2〈F [A(t)]F [A(t′)]〉 (56)
where the averages refer to the process (39,40). The correlation and response functions
(12,13), the order parameters of our problem, are to be solved from (53), in which 〈. . .〉⋆ now
denotes averaging over (55) and the zero-average Gaussian noise {z(t)}, with 〈z(t)z(t′)〉 =
δtt′ . These results represent a fully exact and closed theory for N →∞.
As a simple test we could go back to the standard MG. If we choose F [A] = A, the
effective bid process (39,40) becomes linear, and is solved easily:
A(t) =
∑
t′
(1I +G)−1tt′ [Ae(t
′) + ξ(t′)] (57)
so that we can calculate the kernels Σ and R explicitly:
Rtt′ =
∂
∂Ae(t′)
〈A(t)〉 = ∂
∂Ae(t′)
∑
s
(1I +G)−1ts Ae(s) = (1I +G)
−1
tt′ (58)
Σtt′ = 2〈A(t)A(t′)〉 = 2
∑
ss′
(1I +G)−1ts (1I +G)
−1
t′s′〈[Ae(s) + ξ(s)][Ae(s′) + ξ(s′)]〉
= [(1I +G)−1D[Ae](1I +G
†)−1]tt′ (59)
with D[Ae]tt′ = 2Ae(t)Ae(t
′)+1+Ctt′. One confirms readily that this is the correct solution.
4. Ergodic stationary states for Ae(t) = Ae
We now take Ae(t) = Ae for all t. In time-translation invariant stationary states without
long-term memory one has Gtt′ = G(t − t′), Ctt′ = C(t − t′), Σtt′ = Σ(t − t′), and
Rtt′ = R(t− t′); all three operators {C,G,Σ} and their powers commute. We try to calculate
the four persistent order parameters, χ =
∑
t>0
G(t), χR =
∑
t≥0R(t), c = limt→∞ C(t),
and S20 = limt→∞Σ(t), from the closed equations (53,56). We assume a stationary state
without anomalous response, i.e. both χ and χ
R
are finite numbers. From now on we will
use the the following notation for time averages: x = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑τ
t=1
x(t). Much of the
analysis is standard, and we will where appropriate skip those details that are familiar.
4.1. Equations for persistent order parameters - the effective agent process
We define q˜ = limt→∞ q(t)/t, assuming that this limit exists, and send t → ∞ in the
integrated version of (55). The result is
q˜ =
√
α η + θ − αχ
R
σ (60)
Here σ = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ
∫
Dz σ[q˜t, z] and Dz = (2π)−1/2e−z
2/2dz. Given the properties
of σ[q], in cases where q˜ 6= 0 we must have σ = sgn[q˜].σ[∞]; for q˜ = 0 we know that |σ| ≤ σ[∞].
We inspect the possible solutions ‘fickle’ (q˜ = 0) versus ‘frozen’ (q˜ 6= 0), noting that in both
cases we must have sgn[χ
R
σ] = sgn[η
√
α+ θ]. For the fickle solution the situations is clear:
‘fickle′ :
σ
σ[∞] =
√
α η + θ
αχRσ[∞]
exists if |η√α+ θ| ≤ σ[∞]|χ
R
|α (61)
For the frozen solution we must distinguish between the cases χR > 0 versus χR < 0,
representing negative versus positive feedback in the effective agent equation:
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• χ
R
> 0:
Here, due to the absence of positive feedback in the system, we can write directly
|η√α+ θ| > σ[∞]χ
R
α : ‘frozen′ solution, σ = σ[∞] sgn[η√α+ θ] (62)
|η√α+ θ| ≤ σ[∞]χRα : ‘fickle′ solution, σ = [
√
α η + θ]/αχR (63)
• χ
R
< 0:
As was found earlier in other MG versions with positive feedback, the effective agent
equation now allows for remanence effects, leading to the potential for multiple solutions:
|η√α+ θ| > σ[∞]|χ
R
|α : ‘frozen′ solution, σ = σ[∞] sgn[η√α+ θ] (64)
|η√α+ θ| ≤ σ[∞]|χR |α :
{
‘frozen′ solutions, σ = ±σ[∞]
‘fickle′ solution, σ = [
√
α η + θ]/αχ
R
(65)
For |η√α+ θ| ≤ σ[∞]|χ
R
|α there are two stable solutions σ = ±σ[∞] separated by the
unstable ‘fickle’ one. The two branches σ = −σ[∞] sgn[η√α+ θ] in this region must be
remanent ones, and the Maxwell construction tells us to choose in the stationary state
χR < 0 : ‘frozen
′ solution, σ = σ[∞] sgn[η√α+ θ] (66)
The variance of η is simply equal to S20 , since
〈η2〉 = lim
τ→∞
1
τ 2
τ∑
tt′=0
Σtt′ = lim
t→∞
Σ(t) = S20 (67)
We can now calculate equations for the persistent order parameters, sending θ → 0 as soon
as possible. As before we have to distinguish between χR > 0 and χR < 0:
• χR > 0:
The persistent correlations follow from c = 〈σ2〉⋆:
c =
∫
dη P (η)
{
θ
[
χRσ[∞]
√
α−|η|
]
η2
αχ2
R
+ θ
[
|η|−χRσ[∞]
√
α
]
σ2[∞]
}
=
2S20
αχ2
R
{
1
2
Erf[
χ
R
σ[∞]√α√
2S20
]− χRσ[∞]
√
α√
2πS20
e
−
αχ2
R
σ2[∞]
2S2
0
}
+ 2σ2[∞]
{
1
2
− 1
2
Erf[
χ
R
σ[∞]√α√
2S20
]
}
(68)
The frozen fraction φ and the susceptibility χ are calculated similarly:
φ =
∫
dη P (η)θ
[
|η|−χRσ[∞]
√
α
]
= 1− Erf[χRσ[∞]
√
α
S0
√
2
] (69)
χ =
∫
dη P (η)
∂
∂θ
σ =
1
αχR
Erf[
χ
R
σ[∞]√α
S0
√
2
] (70)
In terms of the usual short-hand v = χ
R
σ[∞]√α/S0
√
2, we then arrive at
c = σ2[∞]
{
1 +
1− 2v2
2v2
Erf[v]− 1
v
√
π
e−v
2
}
(71)
φ = 1− Erf[v] (72)
χ = Erf[v]/αχ
R
(73)
• χR < 0:
This situation is simpler: one has c = 〈σ2〉⋆ = σ2(∞), and φ = 1. The susceptibility χ
for θ = 0 becomes
χ = lim
θ→0
∫
dη P (η)
∂
∂θ
σ =
2σ[∞]√
2παS20
(74)
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If χ
R
< 0 the system is fully frozen, and nothing further happens. To close our persistent
order parameter equations for c and φ if χR > 0, we need the ratio χR/S0; to get also χ
we need χR and S0. We now take Ae(t) = Ae, and define the asymptotic time averages
A = limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ A(t) and F = limτ→∞ τ
−1∑
t≤τ F [A(t)]. This allows us to write
χ
R
= ∂〈F 〉/∂Ae, S0 = 2〈F 2〉 (75)
4.2. Analysis of the effective overall bid process
Closing our stationary state equations requires extracting the values of χ
R
and S0 from the
effective process (39,40) for the overall bids. We separate in the bid noise ξ(t) and the bids
A(t) the persistent from the non-persistent terms:
A(t) = A+ A˜(t), ξ(t) = z
√
1
2
(1 + c) + ξ˜(t) (76)
Here z is a zero-average unit-variance frozen Gaussian variable, and ξ˜(t) is also a zero-average
Gaussian variable, uncorrelated with z and with covariances 〈ξ˜(t)ξ˜(t′)〉 = 1
2
C˜(t − t′). Here
C˜(t) = C(t)− c. Our bid process (39) now becomes
A = Ae − χF + z
√
1
2
(1 + c) (77)
A˜(t) = ξ˜(t)−
∑
s>0
G(s)
{
F [A+ A˜(t− s)]− F
}
(78)
The two quantities A and F are both parametrized by z, so we write A(z) and F (z). Also
the non-persistent bid parts A˜(t) depend on z since A occurs in (78), so we write A˜(t, z). Our
static objects S0 and χR are known once we have F (z). In (77) we have already one relation
for the two objects, so we need one more equation connecting A(z) to F (z) to obtain closed
formulae. To get this second relation we work out F (z):
F (z) =
∫
dA˜ W (A˜|z)F [A(z)+A˜], W (a|z) = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∑
t≤τ
δ[a−A˜(t, z)] (79)
So far our analysis is direct and fully exact. What is left is to find the statistics W (a|z) of
the non-frozen bid contributions, which requires ansa¨tze.
To calculate W (a|z) we assume the response function G to decay much more slowly
than the times over which the A˜(t, z) are correlated, so that to the time summation in (78)
we can apply the central limit theorem. This tells us that also the A˜(t, z) must be zero-
average Gaussian. Let us define the covariance matrix Ξtt′(z) = 〈A˜(t, z)A˜(t′, z)〉, it must be
time-translation invariant, so we write Ξ(t, z) = Ξs+t,s(z). In Appendix A we show that
Ξ(t, z) =
1
2
C˜(t) +O(τC/τG) (80)
If, as in earlier MG analyses [8], we can rely on limN→∞ τC/τG = 0 in the ergodic regime
(this will be our present ansatz) then we have simply Ξ(t, z) = 1
2
C˜(t), and in particular
Ξ(0, z) = 1
2
(1− c), which closes our equations:
A(z) = Ae−χF (z)+z
√
1
2
(1+c), F (z) =
∫
Dx F [A(z)+x
√
1
2
(1−c)] (81)
with the shorthand Dx = (2π)−1/2e−x
2/2dx. We eliminate A(z) and get F (z) = f(z,Ae),
where f(z, Ae) is the solution of the fixed-point equation
f =
∫
Dx F
[
Ae − χf + z
√
1
2
(1 + c) + x
√
1
2
(1− c)
]
(82)
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The shows that F (z) = Φ(Ae + z
√
1
2
(1 + c)), where Φ(u) is to be solved from
Φ(u) =
∫
Dx F
[
u− χΦ(u) + x
√
1
2
(1− c)
]
(83)
Clearly Φ(u) is anti-symmetric, since F [A] is anti-symmetric. Finally, we will solve the
nonlinear functional equation (83). To do this we define a new function ∆(z) via the identity
Φ(u) = [u−∆−1(u)]/χ, insertion into (83) of which gives after some rewriting
∆(z) = z + χ
∫
Dx F
[
z + x
√
1
2
(1− c)
]
(84)
Equation (84) is explicit, but shows that in the case of positive feedback (as for the majority
game, corresponding to F [A] = −A) there is again the possibility of multiple solutions,
which would here take the form of non-invertibility of the function ∆(z). Non-invertibility is
signaled by finding ∆′(z) = 0 for finite z, i.e. by
1 +
χ
√
2√
1− c
∫
Dx xF
[
z + x
√
1
2
(1− c)
]
= 0 (85)
4.3. Equations for χ
R
and S0 - closure of the stationary state theory
Given the solution of (83), we obtain closure of our stationary state equations:
χR =
√
2√
1 + c
∫
Dz zΦ
(
Ae + z
√
1
2
(1 + c)
)
(86)
S20 = 2
∫
Dz Φ2
(
Ae + z
√
1
2
(1 + c)
)
(87)
When expressing these equations in terms of the function ∆−1(z) (which is parametrized by
c and χ) we find that both are expressed in terms of the following Gaussian integrals:
I0(c, χ) =
∫
Dz ∆−1
(
Ae + z
√
1
2
(1 + c)
)
(88)
I1(c, χ) =
∫
Dz z∆−1
(
Ae + z
√
1
2
(1 + c)
)
(89)
I2(c, χ) =
∫
Dz
[
∆−1
(
Ae + z
√
1
2
(1 + c)
)]2
(90)
We note that the validity of the last step depends crucially on non-invertibility issues being
absent or resolved. Substitution of (84) into (86,87), followed by re-arrangements, gives
χR =
1
χ
[
1−
√
2√
1+c
I1(c, χ)
]
(91)
S20 =
2
χ2
[
A2e − 2AeI0(c, χ) + 1
2
(1+c) + I2(c, χ)−
√
2(1+c)I1(c, χ)
]
(92)
For Ae = 0 one has I0(c, χ) = 0 and the above integrals simplify. The equations (91,92) are
to be solved in combination with (71,73) for c and χ. If this results in χR > 0, the problem is
solved and the observable φ follows from (72). As soon as χR ≤ 0, we enter the fully frozen
state c = φ = 1 induced by positive feedback in the valuation dynamics. From (81) we can
also extract an expression for a static overall bid susceptibility χA(z) = ∂A(z)/∂Ae.
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4.4. Simple model examples
At this stage it is appropriate to inspect specific choices for F [A], to serve as tests. We set
Ae = 0 for simplicity; the external bids were needed to calculate the overall bid susceptibility
χR , but are no longer essential.
• F [A] = A, the standard Minority Game:
Here ∆(z) = z(1+χ), so ∆−1(z) = z/(1+χ) and the Gaussian integrals Iℓ(c, χ) become
I0(c, χ) = 0, I1(c, χ) =
√
1+c√
2(1+χ)
, I2(c, χ) =
1+c
2(1+χ)2
(93)
This then reproduces the correct relations
χ
R
= 1/(1+χ), S0 =
√
1+c/(1+χ) (94)
The onset of non-invertibility is according to (85) marked by 1 + χ = 0 (which never
happens in the ergodic phase of the standard MG, where χ ≥ 0). Since always χR > 0
we never enter the fully frozen (remanent) state obtained via the Maxwell construction.
• F [A] = −A, the standard Majority Game:
Here ∆(z) = z(1−χ), so ∆−1(z) = z/(1−χ) and the Gaussian integrals Iℓ(c, χ) become
I0(c, χ) = 0, I1(c, χ) =
√
1+c√
2(1−χ) , I2(c, χ) =
1+c
2(1−χ)2 (95)
The result for χR and S0 is
χR = 1/(χ−1), S0 =
√
1+c/|χ−1| (96)
If χ
R
> 0 (no remanence) one extracts from (73) and (96) that χ = Erf(v)/[Erf(v)−α], so
for α < 1 we can be sure that χ < 0 and run into the contradiction χR < 0. Apparently,
the general scenario is that where χR < 0 and the system is in the fully frozen remanent
state. Hence χ < 1, and its value is given by formula (74), which reduces to
χ =
[
1 +
√
2πα(1+c)
2σ[∞]
]−1
∈ (0, 1) (97)
The condition for leaving the frozen remanent state, viz. χ = 1, is seen to coincide with
the condition for having non-invertibility for the overall bid process, but this condition
will clearly never be met; the system is always in the fully frozen remanent state.
5. Applications - greedy versus cautious contrarians
We now apply our theory to specific choices for the function F [A], all corresponding to models
that so far could only be studied via numerical simulations. For simplicity we choose Ae = 0.
5.1. Preparation
Due to Ae = 0, the equations (91,92) that close our equations for persistent order parameters
simplify to
χχR = 1−
√
2 I1(c, χ)/
√
1+c (98)
|χ|S0 =
√
1 + c+ 2I2(c, χ)− 2
√
2(1+c)I1(c, χ) (99)
with
I1(c, χ) =
∫
Dz z∆−1(z
√
1
2
(1+c)), I2(c, χ) =
∫
Dz
[
∆−1(z
√
1
2
(1+c))
]2
(100)
and with ∆(z) as given in (84). It will prove efficient to define the function
c(v) = σ2[∞]
{
1 +
1− 2v2
2v2
Erf(v)− 1
v
√
π
e−v
2
}
(101)
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Combining our relations so far then allows us to conclude that ergodic solutions with χ
R
> 0
follow from solving the following two coupled equations for the basic unknowns (v, χ), after
which the order parameters φ and c follow via φ = 1−Erf(v) and c = c(v) (so always v ≥ 0):
σ[∞]
√
Erf(v)
v
√
2[1 + c(v)]
= sgn(χ)
{1 + c(v) + 2I2(c(v), χ)− 2√2(1+c(v))I1(c(v), χ)
1 + c(v)−
√
2[1+c(v)]I1(c(v), χ)
} 1
2
(102)
α =
Erf(v)
1−√2I1(c(v), χ)/
√
1+c(v)
(103)
Only χ > 0 is possible, so we are allowed to introduce a further function U(v) ≥ 0,
U(v) =
σ2[∞]Erf(v)
2[1+c(v)]v2
(104)
and compactify our equations for (v, χ), describing solutions with χ > 0 and χR > 0, to
U(v) =
1 + I2(c(v),χ)
[1+c(v)]/2
− 2 I1(c(v),χ)√
[1+c(v)]/2
1− I1(c(v),χ)√
[1+c(v)]/2
α =
Erf(v)
1− I1(c(v),χ)√
[1+c(v)]/2
(105)
One proves from the definitions of I1,2(c, χ) that always I2(c, χ) ≥ 2|I1(c, χ)|
√
[1 + c(v)]/2,
so the numerator of the first of our compact equations is always nonnegative. To have a
solution with χR > 0 we must demand that the denominator is also positive.
In contrast, in states with χ
R
< 0 one has c = σ2(∞), φ = 1 i.e. the system is always
fully frozen. Here the only order parameter left to be calculated is χ, which follows from
2σ[∞]√
2πα[1 + σ2(∞)]
= sgn(χ)
√
1 +
I2(σ2(∞), χ)
[1+σ2(∞)]/2 − 2
I1(σ2(∞), χ)√
[1+σ2(∞)]/2
(106)
Again only χ > 0 is possible (which we may rely upon in the rest of this paper), hence
2σ2[∞]
πα[1 + σ2(∞)] = 1 +
I2(σ
2(∞), χ)
[1+σ2(∞)]/2 − 2
I1(σ
2(∞), χ)√
[1+σ2(∞)]/2
(107)
To confirm that indeed χ
R
< 0 we must verify the outcome of
χR = χ
−1
[
1−
√
2√
1+σ2(∞)
I1(σ
2(∞), χ)
]
(108)
5.2. Invertible overall bid impact functions
Here we focus on those models, which includes the original MG, in which F [A] is
monotonically increasing. The ansatz χ > 0 now guarantees that ∆(z) is invertible. These
models have a remarkable universality property: all exhibit an ergodicity-breaking transition,
marked by χ → ∞, exactly at the value αc of the standard minority game, irrespective of
the precise form of the function F [A]. To demonstrate this we first rewrite (84):
u−∆−1(u)
χ
=
∫
Dx F
[
∆−1(u) + x
√
1
2
(1− c)
]
(109)
From this we conclude that, for all z ∈ IR,
lim
χ→∞
∫
Dx F
[
∆−1(z) + x
√
1
2
(1− c)
]
= 0 (110)
Since F [A] is monotonic, the obvious solution ∆−1(z) = 0 (guaranteed by the anti-symmetry
of F [A]) must be unique, and hence we know that generally limχ→∞∆−1(z) = 0. It now
follows that limχ→∞ I1(c, χ) = limχ→∞ I2(c, χ) = 0, and therefore via (98,99) we find
lim
χ→∞
χχ
R
= 1, lim
χ→∞
|χ|S0 =
√
1+c, lim
χ→∞
S0
χR
= sgn(χ
R
)
√
1+c (111)
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Figure 1. Simulation results for the volatility σ of MG-type models with
F [A] = sgn[A]|A|γ, for γ = 0, 1, 2, 3. Vertical dashed line: predicted location of
the χ→∞ transition. Empty/full markers correspond to biased/unbiased initial
conditions. The location of the phase transition seems indeed independent of γ.
Even for α > αc the volatility appears only weakly dependent upon the greed
exponent γ. However, for values of γ ≥ 4 (excessive agent greed) the ergodic
region is destroyed and the efficient phase of the market vanishes (see fig 4).
æ æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ
æ
æ æ æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç ç
ç ç ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c
α
æ æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ
æ æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç ç ç ç ç
ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
φ
α
Figure 2. Simulation results for the fraction of frozen agents φ and correlations
c for MG-type models with F [A] = sgn[A]|A|γ, for γ = 0, 1, 2, 3. Vertical dashed
line: predicted location of the χ→∞ transition. Empty/full markers correspond
to biased/unbiased initial conditions. As observed for the volatility, also φ and c
appear to be only weakly dependent on γ in the ergodic region α < αc.
The ansatz χ > 0 guarantees sgn(χ
R
) = 1 (with χ
R
↓ 0 as χ→∞), and our persistent order
parameter equations (71,72,73) close at the transition χ → ∞ exactly in the same way as
they would for the conventional MG, i.e.
c = σ2[∞]
{
1 +
1− 2v2
2v2
Erf[v]− 1
v
√
π
e−v
2
}
(112)
α = Erf[v], v = σ[∞]√α/
√
2(1+c) (113)
Theory of agent-based market models with controlled levels of greed and anxiety 15
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
1.0 10.05.02.0 20.03.01.5 15.07.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
c
α
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
1.0 10.05.02.0 20.03.01.5 15.07.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
φ
α
Figure 3. Theory versus simulation results for MG-type models with F [A] =
sgn[A]|A|γ, for γ = 0, 1, 2, 3. Observed versus predicted values of the persistent
correlations c and the fraction of frozen agents φ, for the ergodic regime. Lines:
theoretical prediction; markers: simulation results. There is clearly excellent
agreement between the theoretical predictions and the computer simulations.
So all systems with monotonically increasing anti-symmetric F [A] will, provided they have an
ergodic regime, always exhibit a χ→∞ transition at the conventional MG value αc≈0.3374,
irrespective of the actual form of F [A].
Away from the transition one should expect a dependence of the values of the persistent
order parameters on the choice made for F [A]. However, for ‘sensible’ choices of F [A] one
generally finds this dependence to be weak. To illustrate this we now focus on a particular
class of models, with monotonic valuation update functions of the form
F [A] = sgn[A]|A|γ , γ ≥ 0 (114)
These models are relatively straightforward generalizations of the original MG (which
corresponds to γ = 1), nevertheless for γ 6= 1 the standard solution route (i.e. generating
functional analysis of the strategy selection process, without including the overall bid
dynamics explicitly in the formalism), would not have worked. For γ > 1 the agents with
(114) place more importance on making money by exploiting large fluctuations (|A| > 1), so
can be described as greedy high-risk contrarians, whereas for γ < 1 they prefer to exploit
small market fluctuations, and operate as cautious low-risk contrarians.
We know from the above argument that their χ → ∞ ergodicity breaking transition
point αc will be identical to that of the standard MG. Let us now calculate the persistent
order parameters in the ergodic region α > αc. On physical grounds one does not expect a
negative susceptibility and F [A] increases monotonically, hence ∆(z) will be invertible, and
we can transform the integrals (100) via the substitution z = ∆(x)
√
2/
√
1 + c, and find
I1(c, χ) =
∫
dx√
2π
e−∆
2(x)/(1+c) (115)
I2(c, χ) =
√
2√
1+c
∫
dx√
2π
e−∆
2(x)/(1+c)x2∆′(x) (116)
This removes the need for inversion of ∆(z). For the models (114) one then finds
∆(z) = z + χ
∫
Dx sgn
[
z + x
√
1
2
(1−c)
]∣∣∣z + x
√
1
2
(1−c)
∣∣∣γ (117)
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Figure 4. Fraction of frozen agents φ and volatility σ, measured in simulations
of MG-type systems with F [A] = sgn[A]|A|γ, for γ = 4, 5. Dashed line:
predicted location of the χ → ∞ transition. Empty/full markers correspond
to biased/unbiased initial conditions. For γ ≥ 4 we no longer appear to have the
usual ergodic phase, and more extensive simulations with different durations and
system sizes are required to determine the nature of the macroscopic state(s).
For non-integer γ the integral has to be calculated numerically. For integer γ one finds
γ = 0 : ∆(z) = z + χ Erf
[
z√
1−c
]
(118)
γ = 1 : ∆(z) = z + χz (119)
γ = 2 : ∆(z) = z +
[
z2+
1
2
(1−c)
]
χ Erf
[
z√
1−c
]
+
χz
√
1−c√
π
e−z
2/(1−c) (120)
γ = 3 : ∆(z) = z + χ[z3 +
3
2
(1−c)z] (121)
Since on physical grounds one does not expect a negative susceptibility, invertibility is
expected to hold and the present family of models should behave qualitatively as the ordinary
MG. One also expects that as the susceptibility goes to zero for large alpha the behavior of
the system should be almost independent of the value of γ. For γ ≤ 3 these predictions are
borne out by numerical simulations (all carried out with N = 4097, and measured during 1000
steps after an 2000 steps equilibration period), as shown in figures 1-4. For large γ (excessive
agent greed), however, in spite of the agents still operating as contrarians, the ergodic phase
appears to be destroyed by their increasing focus on big-gain big-risk decisions, and there is
no longer an efficient market regime with low volatility.
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6. Applications - dynamic switching between contrarian trading and
trend following
Next we inspect a class of models in which agents switch from trend-following to contrarian
behaviour, dependent on the absolute value |A| of the overall market bid. The rationale is
to create more realistic agent behaviour, based on interpreting A as a measure of the price
returns in the market. One example was proposed in [11], corresponding to F [A] = ǫA3−A,
with ǫ > 0. This model, in which agents are trend-follows for |A| < 1/√ǫ but contrarians for
|A| > 1/√ǫ, can not be solved analytically using the standard generating functional analysis
route. Here we generalize their model slightly, allowing also for the reverse tendency, where
agents become trend-followers for large instead of small |A|, and analyze the case
F [A] = τA(1−A2/A20), with τ = ±1, A0 > 0 (122)
The model of [11] corresponds to τ = −1 and A0 = 1/√ǫ. For τ = 1, in contrast, agents
behave as contrarians for modest deviations of the returns from their average value, but
switch to herding when they perceive the market to be anomalous, i.e. for |A| > A0. For
A0 → ∞, the model (122) reduces either to the standard MG (for τ = 1) or to a majority
type game (for τ = −1); for A0 → 0 one anticipates the opposite.
6.1. Non-invertible overall bid impact functions
For (122) one finds
∆(z) = z
[
1 + χ˜− 3
2
(1− c)χ˜/A20
]
− χ˜z3/A20 (123)
where χ˜ = τχ. Whether ∆(z) is invertible will depend on A0. If A
2
0(1+χ˜
−1) > 3
2
(1−c), there
will always be a region of non-invertibility, with three solutions z of the equation ∆(z) = ∆.
The latter are the roots of a cubic equation and can therefore be calculated analytically,
z3 − z
[
A20(1 + χ˜)/χ˜− 32(1− c)
]
+
A20∆
χ˜
= 0 (124)
Following [13] we write the cubic equation in the form z3 + 3qz − 2r = 0 by defining
q =
1
2
(1− c)− A20(1 + χ˜)/3χ˜, r = −A20∆/2χ˜ (125)
We can then classify the solution(s) of the equation ∆(z) = ∆ as follows:
q3 + r2 > 0 : one soln, z = [r +
√
q3 + r2]1/3 + [r −
√
q3 + r2]1/3 (126)
q3 + r2 < 0 : three solns, z1 = 2|q| 12 cos(1
3
arccos(
r√
|q|3
)) (127)
z2 = −|q|
1
2 cos(
1
3
arccos(
r√
|q|3
)) +
√
3|q| 12 sin(1
3
arccos(
r√
|q|3
)) (128)
z3 = −|q| 12 cos(1
3
arccos(
r√
|q|3
))−
√
3|q| 12 sin(1
3
arccos(
r√
|q|3
)) (129)
Our solution must respect the symmetry ∆−1(−z) = −∆−1(z), which translates into
searching for a root with z(−r) = −z(r). Inspection reveals that for q3+ r2 > 0 the solution
(126) has the desired symmetry. For q3 + r2 < 0 we find that z2(−r) = −z2(r), and that
z3(−r) = −z1(r). Hence z1,3(r) represent two ‘extremal’ solution branches (related to each
other by inversion symmetry), and z2(r) represents a middle branch. The region of multiple
solutions is defined by |r| < |q|3/2, where we have infinitely many options for assigning a
value to ∆−1(z). The conventional one is the Maxwell construction, based on assuming
the multiplicity of solutions to be caused by remanence. Here the middle branch z2(r) is
taken to be dynamically unstable, and one takes for 0 < r < |q|3/2 the continuation z1(r)
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z(r)
−|q|3/2 |q|3/2
Maxwell option
z(r)
−|q|3/2 |q|3/2
alternative option
Figure 5. The options for constructing an anti-symmetric solution z(r) of the
cubic equation z3 + 3qz − 2r = 0 for q < 0, shown as a function of r. Dashed:
all solutions. Left: the Maxwell construction, which assumes the middle solution
for |r| < |q|3/2 to be unstable, and the others to reflect remanence. Right: the
consequence of assuming the middle solution to be stable. Only the one on the
right turns out to have the correct A0 →∞ limit (see main text).
of the r > |q|3/2 solution, and for −|q|3/2 < r < 0 the continuation z3(r) of the r < −|q|3/2
solution, with a discontinuity at r = 0. Our second option implies assuming the middle
branch to be stable, i.e. choosing z2(r) for |r| < |q|3/2. The two options are illustrated in
figure 5. Assessing which of these choices (if any) is correct would in principle require a
stability analysis of the asymptotic solution of the overall bid dynamics.
Upon translating the above arguments into the language of ∆−1(z), the resulting picture
is the following, where still q = 1
2
(1−c) − 1
3
A20(1+χ˜)/χ˜ but now with r(z) = − 12A20z/χ˜:
q>0 or q<0, |r(z)|> |q|3/2 : ∆−1(z) = [r(z)+
√
q3+r2(z)]
1
3 + [r(z)−
√
q3+r2(z)]
1
3
(130)
Here ∆(z) is fully invertible. In the alternative scenario we have the Maxwell option:
q < 0, |r(z)| < |q|3/2 : ∆−1(z) = 2 sgn[r(z)]|q| 12 cos(1
3
arccos(
|r(z)|√
|q|3
)) (131)
But we also have the non-Maxwell solution, which can be rewritten as:
q < 0, |r(z)|< |q|3/2 : ∆−1(z) = −2|q| 12 sin(1
3
arcsin(
r(z)√
|q|3
)) (132)
Only for A0 →∞ can we decide between our candidate solutions for q < 0 and |r(z)| < |q|3/2
without analyzing dynamic stability in the underlying bid process. There (122) reduces to
the standard MG for τ = 1 and to the standard majority game for τ = −1, both of which we
analyzed in section 4.4. The correct solution must reproduce limA0→∞∆
−1(z) = z/(1 + χ˜).
For A0 → ∞, χ˜ /∈ (−1, 0), and finite z one has q < 0 and |r(z)| < |q|3/2 (in fact
limA0→∞ r(z)/|q|3/2 = 0), so we do indeed probe the region of ambiguity. Our test reveals,
using
√
3 sin( 1
3
arccos(x))− cos( 1
3
arccos(x)) = − 2
3
x+O(x3), that for A0 →∞:
Maxwell soln : ∆−1(z) = A0|1 + χ˜−1|1/2sgn(z) +O(A00), incorrect (133)
alternative soln : ∆−1(z) = z/(1 + χ˜) +O(A−10 ), correct (134)
For χ˜ ∈ (−1, 0) we have q > 0, so there is no ambiguity: ∆−1(z) is given by (130), which for
A0 → ∞ reproduces correctly ∆−1(z) = z/(1 + χ˜) +O(A−10 ). Hence, for A0 → ∞ the only
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acceptable solution is (130,132) ‡. We resolve the remaining ambiguity as follows: since the
pure majority and minority games always exhibit limz→0 ddz∆
−1(z) > 0, we take this property
to hold generally. This means that for weak random bids the effect of agent interaction is to
push these bids back to zero (contrarian action) or to amplify them (trend-following), but
there is no change of sign. For τ = −1 we now have either 3
2
(1 − c)/A20 > 1 − χ−1 and the
unambiguous solution (130), or we have 3
2
(1−c)/A20 < 1−χ−1 and the Maxwell option (131).
For τ = 1 we must always demand 3
2
(1− c)/A20 < 1+χ−1 and the non-Maxwell option (132).
6.2. Conventional χ→∞ transitions
We can now calculate transition lines. In the present model we can have a traditional χ→∞
transition, a transition where χR changes sign (switching from a minority to a majority-type
game), and a transition marking the emergence of jumps in ∆−1(z). We start with the
calculation of the χ→∞ transitions.
For τ = 1, χ→∞ and finite z one has r(z) = O(χ−1) and q = 1
2
(1−c)− 1
3
A20+O(χ−1),
from which it follows that if limχ→∞ 32 (1−c) 6= A20 then
∆−1(z) = − z
χ
[
3
2
(1−c)/A20 − 1
]−1
+O(χ−2) (135)
From this one extracts limχ→∞ I1(c, χ) = limχ→∞ I2(c, χ) = 0, and via the same arguments
that applied to models with invertible bid impact functions one is led to
lim
χ→∞
χχ
R
= 1, lim
χ→∞
χS0 =
√
1+c, lim
χ→∞
S0
χ
R
= sgn(χ
R
)
√
1+c (136)
If χ
R
> 0, our equations (71,72,73) close for χ→∞ exactly as they would for the conventional
MG, with the standard χ → ∞ transition at the value αc ≈ 0.3374. If χR < 0, on
the other hand, no χ → ∞ transition is possible. Taking into account the requirement
limz→0 ddz∆
−1(z) > 0 implies that for τ = 1 the χ→∞ transition exists only if A20 > 32 (1−c).
Here q < 0 and r(z) = O(χ−1), so we are in the remanent region.
For τ = −1, χ→∞ and finite z one still has r(z) = O(χ−1) and q = 1
2
(1−c)− 1
3
A20 +
O(χ−1). So if limχ→∞ 32 (1−c) 6= A20 then for q < 0 we will have |r(z)| ≪ |q|3/2. Hence
A20 <
3
2
(1−c) : ∆−1(z) = z
χ
[
3
2
(1−c)/A20 − 1
]−1
+O(χ−2) (137)
A20 >
3
2
(1−c) : ∆−1(z) = sgn(z)
√
A20 −
3
2
(1−c) +O(χ−1) (138)
If A20 <
3
2
(1−c) we return as expected to the conventional MG transition line at αc ≈ 0.3374;
however, in contrast to τ = 1 this line is now in the non-remanent region. If A20 >
3
2
(1−c),
on the other hand, the χ → ∞ line will be in the remanent region. With some foresight we
now write A20 =
3
2
(1−c) + 1
2
(1+c)Ξ2 with Ξ ≥ 0, and obtain
I1(c, χ) = Ξ
√
1+c
π
+O(χ−1), I2(c, χ) = 1
2
(1+c)Ξ2 +O(χ−1) (139)
which leads to
U(v)− 1 = Ξ
2 − Ξ
√
2/π
1− Ξ
√
2/π
, α = Erf(v)/[1− Ξ
√
2/π] (140)
Upon solving the first equation for Ξ,
Ξ±(v) =
1√
2π
{
2−U(v)±
√
[2−U(v)]2 + 2π[U(v)−1]
}
(141)
‡ It is surprising that in this problem the Maxwell construction is not always the correct way to handle
the multiplicity of solutions, given its track record in physical many-particle systems. However,
minority games do not obey detailed balance, so intuition developed on the basis of bifurcation
analyses obtained via free energy minimization in equilibrium systems may be misleading.
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we then arrive at a convenient parametrization of the transition line in the (α,A0) plane,
with v ≥ 0 as a parameter. The line turns out to have two branches (indicated by ±):
A±0 (v) =
√
3
2
[1− c(v)] + 1
2
[1 + c(v)]Ξ2±(v) (142)
α±(v) = Erf(v)/[1− Ξ±(v)
√
2/π] (143)
We must demand 0 ≤ Ξ±(v) ≤
√
π/2, to guarantee χ
R
> 0, and [2−U(v)]2+2π[U(v)−1] ≥ 0,
to ensure Ξ±(v) ∈ IR. We have now found the χ→∞ transition line for both A20 < 32 (1− c)
(in the non-remanent region, where it is independent of A0), and for
3
2
(1 − c) < A20 <
3
2
(1−c) + 1
4
π(1+c) (in the remanent region, where it depends on A0). At the moment where
A20 =
3
2
(1−c) + 1
4
π(1+c), the bid susceptibility χ
R
goes through zero, marking a switch to
majority game behavior; we find below that this occurs for the + branch at v = 0.
To aid and test numerical evaluation it will be helpful to assess the limits v → 0
and v → ∞ of the above parametrized branches. For small v one finds, using Erf(v) =
(2v/
√
π)[1− 1
3
v2 +O(v4)] and the fact that Ξ(v) cannot be negative,
c(v) = σ2[∞][1− 4v
3
√
π
] +O(v3), U(v) = σ
2[∞]
v[1+σ2[∞]]√π +O(1) (144)
Ξ+(v) =
√
π
2
− v[1+σ
2[∞]]π(π−2)
2σ2[∞]√2 +O(v
2) (145)
Hence
lim
v→0
A+0 (v) =
√
3
2
[1− σ2[∞]] + π
4
[1 + σ2[∞]] (146)
lim
v→0
α+(v) =
4σ2[∞]
[1+σ2[∞]]π(π−2) (147)
For σ[∞] = 1 (no decision noise) this gives limv→0 α+(v) = 2/π(π − 2) ≈ 0.5577 and
limv→0A+0 (v) =
√
π/2 ≈ 1.2533. For v →∞, in contrast, we observe due to limv→∞ U(v) =
0 that the Ξ±(v) are no longer real-valued; both branches terminate and meet at the value
vmax such that [U(vmax)− 2]2 = 2π[1− U(vmax)], i.e. where
U(vmax) =
√
π − 2[√π −√π − 2] (148)
6.3. Onset of remanence-induced discontinuities in the χ
R
> 0 region
It is clear that discontinuities emerge in our equations as soon as q ≤ 0. Even if it is not yet
clear which precise observables will be affected by these discontinuities, it implies that there
exists an alternative transition marked by the condition q = 0, i.e. by
c = 1− 2
3
A20(1 + χ˜
−1) (149)
When (149) holds, we find upon expanding for small q that limq→0∆−1(z) = −(A20z/χ˜)1/3,
and so along the line (149) the integrals (100) reduce to gamma functions:
I1(c, χ) = −
(A20√2(1+c)
2χ˜
)1/3 ∫
Dz |z|4/3 = −
(
A20
√
1+c
2χ˜
√
2
)1/3 1
3
√
π
Γ(
1
6
) (150)
I2(c, χ) =
(A20√2(1+c)
2χ˜
)2/3 ∫
Dz |z|2/3 =
(
A20
√
1+c
χ˜
)2/3 1√
π
Γ(
5
6
) (151)
This leads to
U(v)− 1 = 6Γ(
5
6
)Ξ2 + Γ( 1
6
)Ξ
3
√
π + Γ( 1
6
)Ξ
α = Erf(v)/[1 + Γ(
1
6
)Ξ/3
√
π] (152)
Theory of agent-based market models with controlled levels of greed and anxiety 21
in which now Ξ = [A20/χ˜[1 + c(v)]]
1/3. Solving the first equation for Ξ gives
Ξ±(v) =
Γ( 1
6
)
12Γ( 5
6
)
{
U(v)−2±
√
[2−U(v)]2 − 72[1−U(v)]√πΓ(5
6
)/Γ2(
1
6
)
}
(153)
Again, after combination with the q = 0 condition, we thereby arrive at a parametrization
of the transition line in the (α,A0) plane, with v ≥ 0 as a parameter, with two ± branches:
A±0 (v) =
√
3
2
[1− c(v)]− [1 + c(v)]Ξ3±(v) (154)
α±(v) = Erf(v)/
[
1 +
Γ( 1
6
)
3
√
π
Ξ±(v)
]
(155)
The corresponding value of χ then follows from
χ = τ
[
3[1 − c(v)]
2[1 + c(v)]Ξ3±(v)
− 1
]
(156)
To have Ξ±(v) ∈ IR we must demand [U(v) + 2(ξ − 1)]2 ≥ 4ξ(ξ − 1), where ξ =
18
√
πΓ( 5
6
)/Γ2( 1
6
) ≈ 1.1623. Since U(v) ≥ 0 this implies U(v) ≥ 2√ξ−1(√ξ−√ξ−1) ≈
0.5441. Secondly, to have A0 ∈ IR and α > 0 we must demand, respectively, Ξ±(v) ≤
[ 3
2
[1 − c(v)]/[1 + c(v)]]1/3 and Ξ±(v) ≥ −3√π/Γ( 16 ). The third condition is χ ≥ 0, which
translates into: Ξ±(v) ≥ 0 for τ = 1, and Ξ±(v) ≤ 0 for τ = −1. The second and third
conditions can be combined into
τ = 1 : 0 ≤ Ξ±(v) ≤ [ 3
2
[1− c(v)]/[1 + c(v)]]1/3 (157)
τ = −1 : − 3√π/Γ(1
6
) ≤ Ξ±(v) ≤ 0 (158)
For small v we may use expansion (144), which tells us that U(v) diverges at v = 0, to find
Ξ+(v) =
U(v)Γ( 1
6
)
6Γ( 5
6
)
+O(1) = σ
2[∞]Γ( 1
6
)
6v[1+σ2[∞]]√πΓ( 5
6
)
+O(1) (159)
Ξ−(v) = − 3
√
π
Γ( 1
6
)
+
3πv[1+σ2[∞]]
σ2[∞]Γ( 1
6
)
[18√πΓ( 5
6
)
Γ2( 1
6
)
− 1
]
+O(v2) (160)
Hence
lim
v→0
α−(v) =
2σ2[∞]Γ2( 1
6
)
π[1+σ2[∞]]
(
18
√
πΓ( 5
6
)− Γ2( 1
6
)
) (161)
lim
v→0
A−0 (v) =
√
3
2
[1− σ2[∞]] + 27[1 + σ2[∞]]π3/2/Γ3(1
6
) (162)
For σ[∞] = 0 (i.e. no decision noise) this result gives limv→0 α−(v) = Γ2( 16 )/π[18
√
πΓ( 5
6
)−
Γ2( 1
6
)] ≈ 1.9611 and limv→0A−0 (v) = 3
√
6π3/4/Γ3/2( 1
6
) ≈ 1.3204. For the ‘+′ branch the
limit v → 0 does not exist; instead when v is decreased the line terminates at the value vmin
such that A+0 (vmin) = 0. Finally, the two branches terminate and meet at the value vmax
such that [U(vmax)− 2]2 = 2λ[1− U(vmax)], in which λ = 36√πΓ( 56 )/Γ2( 16 ), i.e. where
U(vmax) =
√
λ− 2[
√
λ−
√
λ− 2] (163)
(note: via the relation Γ(z)Γ(1− z) = π/ sin(πz) one could simplify our expressions further).
6.4. The χ
R
= 0 transition lines
We saw earlier that χR can change sign at the χ =∞ line. Here we inspect the possibility of
having a χ
R
= 0 transition for finite χ and finite α. The effective agent equation (60) would
now give q˜ = η
√
α+ θ, leading to c = σ2[∞] and φ = 1. The susceptibility would become
χ =
1√
α
〈 ∂
∂η
σ〉⋆ = 2σ[∞]√
2παS20
(164)
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The χ
R
transition line is hence to be solved from the following coupled equations for (χ, α,A0):
I1(σ
2(∞), χ) =
√
1
2
[1+σ2(∞)], α = σ
2[∞]/π
I2(σ2(∞), χ)− 12 [1+σ2(∞)]
(165)
One can use χ > 0 as a parameter, solve the first equation for A0(χ), and then calculate
α(χ) via the second. For σ(∞) = 1 (no decision noise) the two equations simplify further to
1 =
∫
Dz z∆−1(z) 1 +
1
απ
=
∫
Dz
[
∆−1(z)
]2
(166)
We will explore this latter case, where ∆(z) = z(1+ τχ)− z3/A20 and r(z) = 12z(A20+3q), in
more detail. This requires working out the function ∆−1(z) for the two model instances.
If τ = 1 we have q = − 1
3
A20(1 + χ
−1) ≤ − 1
3
A20; here we must in the remanent
regime always select the non-Maxwell option (132). We replace χ as a parameter by
λ = 2|q|3/2/(3|q| − A20) ≥ 0. This implies that r(z)/|q|3/2 = −z/λ, and hence
∆−1(z) = sgn(z)
√
|q| Ω(|z|/λ) (167)
Ω(x) = 2θ[1−x] sin(1
3
arcsin(x))− θ[x−1]
{
[x+
√
x2−1] 13 + [x−
√
x2−1] 13
}
(168)
The first equation of (166) then gives
√
|q| = [
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)]−1, and we obtain the following
explicit parametrization of the χR = 0 line:
A0(λ) =
1∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)
√
3− 2
λ
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ) (169)
α(λ) =
1
π
[ ∫Dz Ω2(|z|/λ)
[
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)]2 − 1
]−1
(170)
Let us determine the extremal points. For λ→∞ we use Ω(x) = 2
3
x+ 8
81
x3+O(x5) and get
lim
λ→∞
A0(λ) =
√
3, lim
λ→∞
α−1(λ) = 0 (171)
For small λ we note that the χ
R
= 0 line terminates at the value λc where A0 ceases to be
real-valued. This value λc is the solution of
3
2
λ
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ) = 1 (172)
and corresponds to the following point in the (α,A0) plane:
A0 = 0, α =
1
π
[
9
4
λ2c
∫
Dz Ω2(|z|/λc)− 1
]−1
(173)
If τ = −1 we have q = − 1
3
A20(1−χ−1) and r(z) = 12A20z/χ. Here 3q+A20 = A20/χ ≥ 0 so
q ≥ − 1
3
A20, and in the remanent region we select the Maxwell option (131). If now we define
as our line parameter λ = 2|q|3/2/(3q + A20) ≥ 0 we will have r(z)/|q|3/2 = z/λ, and hence
∆−1(z) = sgn(z)
√
|q| Ω(|z|/λ) (174)
q > 0 : Ω(x) = [x+
√
1+x2]
1
3 + [x−
√
1+x2]
1
3 (175)
q < 0 : Ω(x) = θ[x−1]
{
[x+
√
x2−1] 13 + [x−
√
x2−1] 13
}
+ 2θ[1−x] cos(1
3
arccos(x)) (176)
Again we find the first equation of (166) giving
√
|q| = [
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)]−1 , but now our
parametrization becomes
A0(λ) =
1∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)
√
2
λ
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ) − 3 sgn(q) (177)
α(λ) =
1
π
[ ∫Dz Ω2(|z|/λ)
[
∫
Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)]2 − 1
]−1
(178)
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Figure 6. Phase diagrams for the models with F [A] = τA[1 − A2/A20],
τ = ±1. Solid lines: χ =∞ transition, dashed lines: remanence onset transition,
dotted lines: χ
R
= 0 (minority-to-majority) transition. The MinGame phase is
characterized by χ
R
> 0 (contrarian trading), the MajGame phase by χ
R
< 0
(trend-following). R indicates remanence. In the left picture (τ = −1, giving
trend-following for |A| < A0 and contrarian trading for |A| > A0), the phase
diagram is reasonably complete and reliable. For small A0 we have only the
MinGame phase, with the standard χ → ∞ transition at αc ≈ 0.3374. As A0 is
increased a small remanent region is formed, until we switch to a MajGame state
for large A0. In the right picture (τ = 1, giving contrarian trading for |A| < A0
and trend-following for |A| > A0), we find the MinGame phase, with the standard
χ→∞ transition at αc≈0.3374, for large A0 (as expected). However, the overall
picture is now more uncertain since most of the diagram is remanent. Since we
can never be sure of picking the right solution in the remanent phase, the location
of the χR = 0 line cannot be taken as certain, and indeed intuition suggests that
it should have connected to the point where the χ =∞ and the remanence onset
lines meet. In both diagrams we cannot draw the line separating the non-ergodic
MinGame phase from the MajGame phase for small α; as this line involves non-
ergodic phases, we have no access to it with a theory that assumes ergodicity.
In the limit λ → ∞ we use the expansions Ω(x) = 2
3
x − 8
81
x3 + O(x5) for q > 0, and
Ω(x) =
√
3 + 1
3
x−
√
3
18
x2 +O(x3) for q < 0. We then find
q > 0 : lim
λ→0
A0(λ) =
√
3 ≈ 1.7321, lim
λ→∞
α−1(λ) = 0 (179)
q < 0 : lim
λ→∞
A0(λ) =
√
π
2
≈ 1.2533, lim
λ→∞
α(λ) =
2
π(π−2) ≈ 0.5576 (180)
The latter point coincides with the termination point of the χ→∞ transition line for τ = −1.
The χ
R
= 0 line for τ = −1 can only have a finite λ termination point with A0 = 0 if q > 0,
i.e. in the remanent region. In practice we find no such points for τ = −1, irrespective of q.
6.5. Phase diagrams
We can now summarize the picture obtained by analyzing time-translation invariant states
in terms of a phase diagram. The control parameters are α ≥ 0, A0 ≥ 0 and τ = ±1. We
have so far identified three transition types: χ → ∞, χ
R
→ 0 and q → 0. The result is
shown in figure 6, and discussed in detail in the corresponding figure caption. Most of the
technical subtleties in the present models are generated by remanence, so the phase diagram
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Figure 7. Simulation results for the persistent correlations c, the fraction of
frozen agents φ, and the volatility σ, for τ = −1 (i.e. F [A] = −A + A3/A20).
The chosen values of A−10 should, according to the phase diagram, probe the
MajGame phase of the model, without any χ = ∞ transition. Full markers:
tabula rasa initial conditions; empty markers: biased initial conditions.
for τ = −1 (giving the model of [11]) is the most complete and reliable, since the remanent
region is relatively contained. The situation is different for τ = 1, where most of the phase
diagram is remanent, and consequently we cannot be certain of the location of the χR = 0 line.
A proper resolution here would require going beyond the asymptotic limit of the effective
agent and the effective overall bid processes, in order to determine dynamic stability and
dependence on initial conditions of the values of the persistent order parameters.
6.6. Simulations
We have tested our predictions for the values of persistent order parameters and the locations
of phase transition lines, for the models (122) and for both values of τ . All simulations were
carried out without decision noise, for systems of size N = 4097 and for both unbiased
(qi(0) = ±10−4) and biased (qi(0) = ±1) random initializations. Observables were measured
during 1000 batch steps, following an equilibration stage of 2000 batch steps.
We begin with τ = −1 (the model of [11]). In figure 7 we present results for the
volatility σ, the persistent correlations c, and the fraction of frozen agents φ, for values of
A−10 corresponding to the MajGame regime, without remanence. The simulations indeed
Theory of agent-based market models with controlled levels of greed and anxiety 25
æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
æ æ æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æç ç ç ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ æ
æ æ
æ æ
æ æ
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç ç
ç ç
ç ç
ç ç ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
1
2
3
4
5
6
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æç
ç
ç ç ç ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ æ æ æ
æ æ
æ æ
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç ç ç ç ç ç
ç ç
ç ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
1
2
3
4
5
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æç
ç ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
æ æ æ æ æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ æ æ æ æ æ
æ æ æ
ç
ç ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç ç ç ç ç ç ç ç ç
ç ç ç
1.000.50 5.000.10 10.000.050.01
1
2
3
4
5
α α α
c φ σ
A−1
0
≈ 1.30
A−1
0
= 1
A−1
0
≈ 0.95
Figure 8. Simulation results for the persistent correlations c, the fraction of
frozen agents φ, and the volatility σ, for τ = −1 (i.e. F [A] = −A+A3/A20). The
chosen values of A−10 should, according to the phase diagram, probe the region
close where a A0-dependent χ = ∞ transition occurs (indicated with a vertical
dashed line), with a MinGame phase for large α. Full markers: tabula rasa initial
conditions; empty markers: biased initial conditions.
reproduce a majority-game type state for large A0 (top row), but as A0 is reduced (middle
and bottom rows) the system exhibits behaviour that is less clear-cut than what is suggested
by the phase diagram. We are still in the non-remanent region, so this cannot be explained
by remanence effects. Close to the remanent region R of the τ = −1 phase diagram, the
simulations are in rough agreement with the predictions, see figure 8. The vertical dashed
line marks the χ = ∞ transition, and seems to agree with simulations within the finite size
limitations. In figure 9 we probe the region where we expect MG-type behaviour. This is
borne out in the ergodic region, for α > αc (and the transition is found in the right place,
in agreement with the phase diagram). However, for α < αc the behaviour is found to be
far from typical; in contrast to the standard MG, the differences between the biased and
unbiased initial conditions are small, and more likely to result of instabilities than long-term
memory. In fact one notes similarities in behavior with figure 4 for F [A] = sgn(A)|A|γ with
γ = 4, 5; this suggest as a possible explanation that if A−10 gets larger, the first term of the
present F [A] = A3/A20−A plays a role similar to sgn(A)|A|γ with γ ≥ 4.
In figure 10 we present simulation results for the most difficult case τ = 1, i.e.
F [A] = A − A3/A20. These show that the anticipated transition from a MinGame phase at
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Figure 9. Simulation results for the persistent correlations c, the fraction of
frozen agents φ, and the volatility σ, for τ = −1 (i.e. F [A] = −A + A3/A20).
The chosen values of A−10 should, according to the phase diagram, probe the
region close where a χ =∞ transition should occur at the conventional MG value
αc ≈ 0.3374 (indicated with a vertical dashed line), with an ergodic MinGame
phases for large α and a non-ergodic MinGame phase for small α. Full markers:
tabula rasa initial conditions; empty markers: biased initial conditions. We note
that the behavior in the non-ergodic regime is not typical of the standard MG.
small values of A−10 to an MajGame phase for larger A
−1
0 indeed occurs, but for some value
0.25 ≤ A−10 ≤ 0.5, which differs from the prediction in the phase diagram. Furthermore,
one notes instabilities of multiplicities of states in the remanent regime, to the right of
the χ = ∞ transition. These deviations for τ = 1 are of course not unexpected, since
the τ = 1 phase diagram is plagued by remanence. They could be caused by many things,
possibly in combination: incorrect selection of mathematical solutions in the remanent phase,
insufficiently equilibrated simulations made worse by remanence, alternative transitions (e.g.
onset of weak long-term memory), etc.
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Figure 10. Simulation results for the persistent correlations c, the fraction
of frozen agents φ, and the volatility σ, for the troublesome case τ = 1 (i.e.
F [A] = A − A3/A20). According to the phase diagram, one should for small
A−10 find a conventional χ = ∞ phase separating an ergodic from a non-ergodic
MinGame phase. For larger A−10 we should at some point enter a MajGame
phase. Full markers: tabula rasa initial conditions; empty markers: biased initial
conditions. Although the observed behaviour agrees with the theory for small
A−10 , and indeed a MajGame phase appears as A
−1
0 is increased, the point where
this happens does not agree with the phase diagram. This underlines the problems
in the identification of transition lines in the remanent region of the phase diagram,
which are indeed much more profound for τ = 1.
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7. Discussion
Minority-game type models have an amazing ability to describe new phenomena within an
accessible mathematical framework, and to throw up new mathematical surprises and puzzles.
In this paper we have studied generalized agent-based market models of the MG-type (in their
so-called ‘fake history’ batch version), in which the agents’ strategy valuation update rule
is allowed to depend on the overall market bid, via an impact function F [A] (which would
be F [A] = ±A for the standard minority and majority games, respectively). The function
F [A] allows us to model the effect of agents’ interpretation of the state of the market (the
magnitude of the fluctuations), assuming that whether price fluctuations are perceived to be
large or small should somehow influence how agents trade in financial markets. Our motive is
to incorporate into solvable market models such behavioral elements. In this study we focus
on two model classes: one in which agents are always contrarians, but where we can control
their greed and willingness to take risks, viz. F [A] = sgn(A)|A|γ , and one in which agents
can switch between trend following and contrarian trading, viz. F [A] = ±A[1 − A2/A20],
somewhat reminiscent of how they would adapt to booming and ‘bear’ markets.
At a mathematical level, the generating functional analysis of the present class of models
requires studying the overall bid evolution explicitly, similar to how one would study models
with real market history. It turns out that a key issue in working towards closed self consistent
equations for persistent order parameters is whether the overall bid process is remanent. In
non-remanent cases, such as F [A] = sgn(A)|A|γ , solution is direct and relatively easy, and
the agreement between theory and simulations is excellent (for this particular model: unless
γ becomes too large, where we lose the ergodic phase altogether). In remanent cases, such
as F [A] = τA[1 − A2/A20] with τ = ±1, we need to rely on ansa¨tze and Maxwell-type
approximations to select a solution from the possible stationary states, especially for τ = 1,
and the agreement between theory and experiment is consequently limited.
Once more, what appear at first sight to be simple modifications of the standard MG lead
to highly nontrivial and unexpected behaviour (even in batch models with fake histories). As
soon as agents are allowed to adapt their trading style to the magnitude of the fluctuations,
in the spirit of [11], one introduces a non-trivial effective overall bid process, with new
instabilities and new transitions. We are now approaching the point where theories based on
persistent order parameter equations only, the ones that benefit most from the simplifications
induced by having ‘frozen agents’, are no longer giving us the information we need. In models
dominated by remanence, which are the type one needs when including more realistic agent
behaviour, we can no longer avoid solving the full dynamics more explicitly.
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Appendix A. Scaling of overall market bid covariances
We defined the overall bid covariance matrix as Ξtt′(z) = 〈A˜(t, z)A˜(t′, z)〉. It must be time-
translation invariant, so we write Ξ(t, z) = Ξs+t,s(z), i.e. Ξ(t, z) = 〈A˜(s, z)A˜(t+ s, z)〉. From
(78) we extract:
Ξ(t, z) =
1
2
C˜(t)−
∑
s
G(s)
{
〈F [A(z) + A˜(t−s, z)]A˜(0, z)〉+ 〈F [A(z) + A˜(−s, z)]A˜(t, z)〉
}
−
∑
ss′
G(s)G(s′)〈
{
F [A(z) + A˜(t− s, z)]F [A(z) + A˜(−s′, z)]− F 2(z)
}
〉 (A.1)
Since the non-persistent bids are Gaussian this equation gives an explicit relation from which
to solve their covariances; along the lines of [15] we apply the general relation
〈G[A˜(t, z), A˜(t′, z)]〉 =
∫
DxDy (A.2)
×G
[ x√
2
√
S1(t− t′) + y√
2
√
S2(t− t′), x√
2
√
S1(t− t′)− y√
2
√
S2(t− t′)]
]
where S1(t− t′) = Ξ(0, z)+Ξ(t−t′, z), S2(t− t′) = Ξ(0, z)−Ξ(t−t′, z). In particular we need
the two quantities
〈F [A(z) + A˜(u, z)]A˜(v, z)〉 = Ξ(u−v, z)F ′(z) (A.3)
and
〈F [A(z)+A˜(u, z)]F [A(z)+A˜(v, z)]〉 =
∫
DxDy F
[
A(z) +
x√
2
√
S1(u−v) + y√
2
√
S2(u−v)
]
× F
[
A(z) +
x√
2
√
S1(u−v) − y√
2
√
S2(u−v)
]
(A.4)
For u = v this gives simply 〈F 2[A(z)+ A˜(u, z)]〉 = F 2(z). The first average above is of order
Ξ. The second average can for u 6= v be expanded in powers of Ξ(u − v, z) (which should
decay to zero quickly), using
I(ξ) =
∫
DxDy F
[
A+
x√
2
√
Ξ(0)+ξ +
y√
2
√
Ξ(0)−ξ
]
× F
[
A+
x√
2
√
Ξ(0)+ξ − y√
2
√
Ξ(0)−ξ
]
=
{∫
Dx F [A+ x
√
Ξ(0)]
}2
+ ξ
{∫
Dx F ′
[
A+ x
√
Ξ(0)
]}2
+O(ξ2) (A.5)
Thus we conclude that
〈F [A(z) + A˜(u, z)]F [A(z) + A˜(v, z)]〉 − F 2(z) = δuv
[
F 2(z)− F 2(z)
]
+ (1−δuv)Ξ(u−v, z)
[{
F ′(z)
}2
+O(Ξ(u−v, z))
]
(A.6)
which leads to
Ξ(t, z) =
1
2
C˜(t)− F ′(z)
∑
s>0
G(s)
{
Ξ(−s− t, z) + Ξ(−s+ t, z)
}
−
[
F 2(z)− F 2(z)
]∑
s>0
G(s)G(s− t)
−
[
F ′(z)
]2∑
s>0
∑
v>t−s,v 6=0
G(s)G(s− t+ v)Ξ(v, z)[1 +O(Ξ)] (A.7)
At this point we inspect how various terms scale. We know from earlier MG work (especially
from approximate calculations of the volatility, see e.g. [8]) that the relaxation of the response
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function G is very slow. Upon making an ansatz of the form G(t) = χ(eµ − 1)e−µt one can
show that in the stationary state one must put µ→ 0 (the relaxation time seems to diverge
with N in an as yet undetermined way). For such an exponential ansatz one would find∑
s>0
G(s)G(s − t) = χ2e−µ|t|(eµ − 1)/(eµ + 1) = O(µχ2). Thus if µ → 0 the second term
in (A.7) vanishes in the ergodic regime. In the final term we use our earlier ansatz that the
correlations Ξ(s) decay on short times; formula (A.7) suggests that this relaxation time will
be that of C˜(t). If this relaxation time is τC , we may estimate the scaling of the last term in
(A.7) as O(µτCχ2). So, upon writing the relaxation time of the response function as τG, we
may replace µ→ 1/τG and write (A.7) as
Ξ(t, z) =
1
2
C˜(t)− F ′(z)O(τC/τG)−
[
F 2(z)− F 2(z)
]
O(1/τG)
−
[
F ′(z)
]2
O(τC/τG) (A.8)
